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Introduction
The Value of Music
What does it mean to say that music has or lacks Value? Music hardly even presents itself
to you. It happens in passing, a fleeting sensation inspired by invisible waves. You don’t hold it;
it is merely heard and felt. One might represent a song with an MP3, CD, or concert ticket, but
the music itself lacks the physical, visible presence of a painting or sculpture. It is an artform that
relies on reproduction and representation to be seen, in the form of sheet music or as a recorded
product that is distributed using disks and bits. Does this lack of visual reference, however,
actually enforce the notion that it is lacks Value? The obvious answer is a resounding “no!”
Some people value nothing higher than music. I spend most of my time thinking, reading, and
writing about music. Primarily, I am a musicmaker, a songwriter and performer, and started this
creative process before I could even play an instrument, employing the help of friends to lay
down the instrumentals I needed. Apart from the music I make, I make music happen. I host
concerts and run a venue at Bard, curating lineups and publicizing events. I help bands afford
gas and food on tour and give students something to do together. Furthermore, I am a consumer
of music music, listening to a favorite album, looking for new bands, styles, and scenes. All of
this is a testament to the enjoyment music provides for me and indicates that musicmaking and
listening contain something worthwhile. What is this something? How then might I qualify or
quantify this worthwhileness? In short, how can we define the Value of music?
Let us be clear, since I started writing this project I have stolen hundreds of hours of
music. I download music all the time without even thinking about it, instinctive impulse driving
me for find the leak of a record regardless of whether I think that I will like it or not. I consume
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without remorse and generally won’t buy an album unless I have heard it first. I used to get
excited when I scraped together twenty dollars to get a new CD. I would tuck myself away,
listening on my Discman intently, trying to get my moneys worth. Yet, were those albums any
more valuable to me because I had paid for them? In retrospect, I enjoyed many of the albums I
bought back then because I would be ashamed to hate something I had saved up to buy. Now that
any album is available at my fingertips for free, however, there is a greater opportunity to be
critical. There is still excitement as I download the album, but it doesn’t force me to enjoy it. It is
presented without economic incentives or implications. Thus, one can begin to see how those
who might devalue music, in an economic sense, also become those able to freely value it for
themselves as an object of contemplative pleasure.
Therefore, this project is aimed at determining how I can live the contradiction of valuing
music so highly, while unabashedly treating it as a valueless commodity. This is not meant to
justify my rampant theft of music, but instead offer a metaphysical definition of Value that
reinvigorates that which is already valueless in an economic sense. There is little consideration
as to whether an audiorip of a song uploaded to Youtube is morally reprehensible, let alone the
backwards business models of services like iTunes and Spotify. The artist is rarely receiving
substantial financial compensation in any of these situations, so how can the economic value of
music ever be thought of as defining Value? As of late, there has been more media attention
exposing these issues thanks to Alist musicmakers like Taylor Swift who have requested tighter
control over the outlets through which their music is made available. Still, I feel as if there is an
obligation to examine the Value of music in an academic setting in order to potentially
reevaluate that which has been seemingly devalued.
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Therefore, the purpose of this project is to present three distinct philosophical viewpoints
that contribute to a broader definition of something called 
Value
. People use the term value in
the context of the arts regularly, but not all of these usages are synonymous and leave room for
confusion, elaboration, and collaboration. Primarily using select writings from Karl Marx,
Martin Heidegger, and Walter Benjamin, I will address ways in which Value is broken down in
terms of each author's usage and viewpoint, ultimately articulating that the Value of music is
related to, but not fully defined in terms of economics, aesthetics, metaphysics, and ritual.
Explicitly, the goal of my first chapter is to use select writings by Karl Marx 
to describe
and critique the relationship between economic value and Value. Usevalue and exchangevalue,
as economic terms, are used to calculate supply and demand and provide the price at which
goods are sold, while meagerly rewarding the labor and laborers required of its production. At no
point, however, does the commodification of Music become definitional of its Value. Marx does
not believe that any industry properly values the worker or their work, and the relationship of
music to commodity and musicmaker to laborer only exemplifies this issue. Marx is relevant to
defining Value not only because economic value is merely a common usage of the word value,
but because Marx, like myself, finds the reduction of Value to something like economic value
problematic. Moreover, Marx’s contribution to my definition of Value includes almost a
prophetic element, in that his issues with capitalism apply less and less to the contemporary
music industry. Thanks to widely available recording equipment and distribution platforms
serving to democratize the means of production, there is a sense that the music industry in crisis
and revolution. This crisis is thought to some as the death of the music industry, but the financial
instability of former music giants is that the independent artists is more able to produce and
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distribute music as ever. Ultimately, Marx will show that music is treated as a commodity, but
the Value of music is definitely different from the market value this commodity fetches and one
can and should think about what Value means in a noneconomic sense. Both the potential
producer and consumers of music must reconcile the price tag music is given with the Value they
attribute to a work independent of any economic considerations, especially as the financial
promise of musicmaking becomes less sure than ever.
Clearly there is a need to look at Value from a noneconomic perspective. 
In the wake of
Marx’s contribution to the Value of music, Martin Heidegger’s 
The Origin of the Work of Art
will be brought into consideration as it is concerned with concealing and revealing something
like the Value of art. In opposition to economic materialism and in keeping with Marx’s
postcapitalist predictions, Heidegger distills the being of a work of art to its origin, an origin
which I hope to use defining its Value. The origin of the work of art, in brief, is understood as a
selfreliant relationship between the artist and the work of the artist. By means of a somewhat
circular logic, the work of art is shown to be a product of the artist working, but this work does
more than merely produce a commodity. Art presents a conflict between the earth and the world,
between the material and the metaphysical, and out of this conflict emerges something called
truth
. For Heidegger, it is truth which a work of art must embody. Value, a term which
Heidegger does not use in 
The Origin of the Work of Art
, is brought into this conversation on the
grounds that truth is something valuable so much so that it is of primordial importance and is
inextricable from the work of art. Therefore, I hope to use Heidegger to reinforce a definition of
Value which shows that music is valuable regardless of the price tag attached to it and this Value
transcends the very materiality that has made the defining of Value so difficult.
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The third and final chapter of this project attempts to use the arguments made by Marx
and Heidegger as a means of reconciling economic materialism and metaphysical abstraction.
The guiding force behind this reconciliation is Walter Benjamin’s 
Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction
. Benjamin is helpful to defining Value insofar as he offers a modernized
perspective on the production and consumption of arts that rely heavily on reproduction. Yet, in
opposition to Benjamin, I hope to demonstrate that music retains Value today and that
reproduction is not so much a corrosive force as much as it has provoked a paradigm shift in the
way that Value is thought of in terms of the arts. Benjamin directly responds to Marx in his
discussion of art insofar as he is concerned with the industrialization of art as a commodity and
how this mass production affects the way art is consumed and appreciated. Heidegger, unlike
Marx, is not directly referenced by Benjamin, yet remains relevant to Benjamin’s discussion of
‘aura,’ and the ‘authenticity,’ as related to or synonymous to truth, that a work of art is or is not
able to preserve when reproduced. 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction not only helps
define Value insofar as Benjamin might be reinterpreting valuations previously made by Marx
and Heidegger, but also explicitly discusses ‘cult’ and ‘ritual’ value. These terms are unique to
Benjamin, and will be used to contend with and extend Benjamin’s thought process in my final
to push to finally define of Value.
Working through and interrelating Marx’s economic theories and Heidegger and
Benjamin’s propositions about art, I hope to show some of the many facets that contribute to a
definition of the Value of music. This definition of Value to identifies ways in which one can
avoid the passive or active devaluation of music from which music, musicmaker, and audience
all can suffer. Ultimately, this project is about empowering the artform in the face of the

8

pessimism and ambivalence about the future of the music industry. Music has Value and it
should be treated as such. Music has Value. It is merely a matter of identifying different ways of
discussing Value that can be used to articulate what this truth offers. Just as there is knowledge
in philosophy if one has the patience and endurance to dig through the writings, music has truth
at its core and this truth requires deliberation to access.
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I
Wage, Labor, and Capital Records
The aim of this project is to define the Value of the music. The key issue in determining
Value, however, relies on identifying exactly the kind of Value which one wants to define. A call
on a payphone might cost $0.35 cents, but the Value of the phone call is situational, not
economic. One one considers the Value of any good or service, the subsequent valuation because
personalized, a willingness based upon interest. For example, one might buy a $855.00 Arc’teryx
insulated winter jacket, but live in a temperate climate and never have occasion to use it. Does
the jacket still hold Value if it merely sits in one’s closet? Would one save it when rushing to
collect prized possessions during a house fire? It is clear, the relative worth of one’s world is
reflected in one's possessions and preferences, not price tags. Accordingly, one’s values might
vary over time, generating a personal history of decisionmaking, time management, and
consumption which reflects what one finds worthwhile.
It is difficult enough to objectively determine the Value of a phone call and an
overpriced jacket, let alone the artistic output of a musician. Difference in taste, talent,
advantage, and even genetics dictate an individual’s interests, affecting or enhancing
something’s Value in the ears and eyes of the beholder. This sort of determination, now defined
as subjective value, will be avoided in this chapter and focus on that aspect of Value experienced
at its most quotidian, i.e. the 
economic value one confronts on a daily basis. One should already
be aware of economic value cannot serve to completely define Value, but what does Marx’s
consideration of economic value have to say Value more broadly? What exactly does economic
value lack?
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Economic value is a numerical value. It appears on price tags and is the result of a series
of commercial interactions which set this price. Macroeconomic theory, in its broadest terms,
looks at the intersection of supply and demand as means of determining the value of a good or
service, a theory which originates with Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ (Smith, bk. 4 ch. 2 par. 9).
In the economic realities of the music industry, there are certain costs which are incurred during
the production of a recording which subsequently justify the price tag. The sunk costs of making
music arise from studio, engineering, production, and promotional fees, not to mention the cost
of instruments, time and energy training and writing, as well as what every physical album costs
to produce in paper and plastic. All of these expenses contribute to an upward supply curve and a
certain minimum price tag. The demand for music, on the other hand, is much harder to pinpoint.
What makes a price worth paying? On a microeconomic level, this question is answered by the
interaction between the supplier’s ‘willingness to accept’ (i.e. sell) and the demander’s
‘willingness to pay’. For goods in general, the willingness to accept, based on the cost of
production as well as the prospects of profit, must match the willingness to pay, or else the
supplier will not move his or her merchandise and will go out of business (so it goes.)
With the stakes between buyer and seller set, one is left with a few questions more
relevant to my investigation. Using these economic grounds, how is the Value of music
determined? How is the economic value of music indicative of or detrimental to its more general
Value? Or, at least, how can one use economic value to generate some sense as to what the Value
of music might be? Primarily, the aim of this chapter becomes to more accurately and
articulately address the network of factors that contribute to the the conventional economic value
which music consumers have come to accept. It is nevertheless important to reiterate that
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economic value will not and cannot serve as the Value of music for which this chapter ultimately
hopes to define. One must inevitably account for the way in which individuals perceive and
reflect upon music they make or hear as a subjective aspect of its Value. Economic value is
merely a starting point, a given, necessarily raising questions about Value which are often
masked by economic valuation. Within this discussion of music as a commodity, the writings of
Karl Marx will be brought brought to bear, repurposing his critique of capitalism to explain the
common confusion of the economic value of music which stands publicly for a more involved
definition of Value.

Music As Commodity
As a means of getting into Marx’s involved argument about economic value and how it
applies to the Value of music, one must must first reckon with his lexicon. To this end, we must
ask the question “what is a commodity?” Of course, in the United States as well as much of the
world, one can point to almost anything and discuss it as a commodity. There is a global culture
of exchange and one is generally brought up knowing that everything comes at a price. Marx,
however, tries his best to distance himself from the problem of subjective value, which is the
price an individual establishes for a certain item based on his or her tastes alone. Instead,
commodity value stands to represent purely the economic considerations that are dictated in the
production and sale of goods.
He begins his chapter in 
Capital on the commodity by stating that “the commodity is in
the first place, an object outside of us, a thing that by its properties satisfies human needs of
some sort or another. The nature of these needs is irrelevant, e.g., whether their origin is in the
stomach or in the fancy” (Marx, 
Capital 303). Beginning in this way, Marx has already provided
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distance between the commodity and oneself. It is external, outside of us, and necessary “in the
stomach or in the fancy,” as a mode of appetite or interest, but the origin of this necessity is not a
concern. It is only insofar as the object is produced and consumed that it becomes recognizable
as a commodity and establishes an economic value. Music fits into Marx’s model of the
commodity since it is external and somehow satisfies a human need. Although the argument can
be made that music originates out of interior, creative inspiration, a song always takes a physical
form as vibrations of the air, a discrete physical form which cannot be seen, but is nevertheless
perceived. These vibrations are objects, external and experienced aurally, but a song which never
resonates in a concert hall or in the home is merely an idea and cannot fit the definition of music
as commodity. There are, of course, songs which remain private, are never publically heard or
sold, but only those that are can have an economic value. The Value of music for the self is
independent of economic value, and is an early indication that exchange is not everything.
One might debate that music is a luxury, not necessary in the same sense as food, water
or air, but it satisfies a need of another order. A huge number of people have gravitated towards
the artform, making different styles of music with different messages, in separate contexts, and
for varying audiences. Music is produced and consumed, and this production and consumption
cannot be seen as aimless or unnecessary as long as it persists. To quote Marx, “we are also not
concerned here with the manner in which the entity satisfies human need; whether in an
immediate way as food – that is, as object of enjoyment – or by a detour as means of production”
(Marx 
303). Marx is not interested in enjoyment or even objects as means to certain ends.
Exchange is the end in itself. Value is distilled to economic value, in the context of supply and
demand, both of which are motivated by external factors, yet ultimately resolve in the form of a
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price tag. One need is not weighed over another, based on its relative importance of the
commodity. Economic value is directly dependant upon how it finds its worth through a larger
social interaction.
For Marx the nature of the need which brings any commodity into being remains
detached from the economic value this commodity holds, yet the fact that there is this need is of
primary importance to its Value. As a means of recognizing the relationship between need and
economic value, Marx asserts that “It is the utility of a thing for human life that turns it into a
usevalue... Usevalue realizes itself only in use or in consumption; usevalues form the
substantial content of 
wealth, whatever its 
social form may be. In the form of society which we
are going to examine, they form the substantial bearers at the very same time of 
exchangevalue
”
(Marx 303). In this statement, Marx acknowledges that something must be 
useful
, perhaps
selfdefinitionally, to become of use and subsequently consumed. This very usefulness lends
itself to the 
substantial content of 
wealth that a commodity possesses in isolation and ultimately
yields an 
exchangevalue
, a term which is more or less analogous with the economic value found
in an object’s price tag. Evidently, there is variation between the exchangevalue and the content
of wealth that is inherent to the commodity. A supplier or producer always wants to sell a good
at the highest price possible, while the market drives this price lower, depending on the factors
previously outlined as consumer demand and willingness to pay.
To get a better sense of the relationship between usevalue and exchangevalue, Marx
brings into question two commodities, iron and wheat, in order to show how commodities
codevelop an economic relationship and, subsequently, a need for monetization. “Whatever
their exchange relationship may be, it is always representable in an equation in which a given
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quantum of wheat is equated with some particular quantum of iron; e.g., one quarter of wheat = a
cwt of iron” (Marx 304). Regardless of the existing price of these two items, there remain
relative quantities at which they can can be traded for one another. Therefore, “both are equal...
to a third entity, which in and for itself is neither the one nor the other. Each of the two, insofar
as it is an exchangevalue, must therefore be reducible to this third entity, independent of the
other” (Marx 304). In mentioning this third entity, Marx is cementing monetary theory as a
means of making exchange more manageable. There is a tertiary good, money, which in itself
does not have an explicit, practical use, but comes to represent the value of not only the
relationship between two goods, such as wheat and iron, but all goods. In this system, usevalue
is said to answer to exchangevalue only as long as the exchangevalue, represented monetarily,
remains relative to the usevalue of all goods. Despite the seemingly lack of usevalue money
might have on its own, it is, in fact, that which becomes most useful in its ability to be traded for
other items. Therein, money becomes that which is able to consolidate the entirety of usevalues
under one term, ultimately allowing for consistency in exchange and economic value in general.
Therefore, an aspect of Value is the money that is needed to acquire the object which is thought
to possess Value and this monetary value is the standard by which economic values are most
commonly considered.
At this time, I will bring music, as a commodity, back into question. Generally, our
culture is not one that relies on bartering, so it is difficult to imagine a musicmaker trading a
song for an unspecified quantity of iron. Sure, there are street performers who perform for food,
relics of bards and religious players seeking the means to survive directly off their trade. Yet,
modern musicmaking more often falls back on its monetary exchangevalue to represent the
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usevalue one might apply to it. Musicmakers are used to making money because they are raised
within the conditions of capitalism that require financial returns. The problem with music,
however, arises when one seeks to use the aforementioned micro and macroeconomic theories to
account for or justify its exchangevalue. Of course, there are the sunk costs of training as a
musicmaker and the music this musicmaker produces, but the cost of supplying the market with
music does not generally yield the sort of income one would expect of another industry. Yes,
record labels, for example, must take into consideration the cost of production when they
calculate a price tag in order to remain in business, but amateur and semiprofessional
musicmakers do not and cannot rely on this standard price to make a living.
Not only is it difficult to quantify how much one song costs to produce, but a
musicmaker is always reckoning and compromising with the consumer’s willingness to pay.
“Successful” popstar and musicmakers can make a comfortable living off of the average price
the music holds in the freemarket. They sell enough songs or concert tickets to gain positive
financial returns. Yet, more often than not, musicmakers either voluntarily undervalue the music
they produce in order to reach a wider audience, or they place an economic value on the music
which is equal to their personal expense, but exceeds the consumer's willingness to pay. In either
instance, the substantial content of wealth that the music might garner fails to align with its
exchangevalue, and requires a revaluation of its potential usevalue on the part of the
musicmaker.
Marx recognizes this inequality, even without using music as his example. For instance,
Marx states that “The fact that the substance of the exchangevalue is something utterly different
from and independent of the physicalsensual existence of the commodity or its reality as a
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usevalue is revealed immediately by its exchange relationship.... As far as the exchangevalue is
concerned, one commodity is, after all, quite as good as every other, provided it is present in the
correct proportion” (Marx 304). To this end, Marx is indirectly accounting for the discrepancies
in price that one experiences in the music industry. Although one song cannot be understood as
objectively better than any other without a consideration of enjoyment or subjective worth,
exchangevalue can vary independently because of the market as an independent source of value
that can dictate a consumer's willingness to pay or a supplier’s willingness to accept.
Specifically, Marx suggests that “the common social substance which merely manifests itself
differently in different usevalues, is – 
labor” 
(Marx 305). Naturally, Marx brings into question
the role of the worker in dictating value because labor is not only accounted for in the cost of
production, but also provides the wages that command a consumer's willingness to pay, i.e. the
means of consumption. Only insofar as a commodity can be afforded can it be said to possess an
exchangevalue.

MusicMaking As Labor
This chapter does not concern itself with that which is priceless. In 
Twilight of the Idols
,
Nietzsche states that “Without music, life would be a mistake,” but for Marx, music and the
usevalue thereof function by means of the same economic standards as any other commodity
(Nietzsche sec. 33). It is not a matter of aesthetic or poetic value, as Nietzsche attributes to the
art form. Instead, economic value reveals itself by means of the components that contribute to its
being as commodity and the 
labor which justifies said economic value. Therein, one can
understand the Value of music, for Marx, in terms of the Value of labor, which contains a
normative and moral quality that exchangevalue explicitly lacks.
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How does Marx directly relate the commodity to labor? Primarily, he states that
“commodities as values are nothing but 
crystallized labor” (Marx 305) Insofar as something is
given value, Marx explicitly states that there is labor, both on the end of the supplier and the
consumer, which accounts for a commodities economic or exchangevalue. This crystallization,
explicitly, is a conversion of service to goods and “a usevalue or good only has a 
value 
because
labor is 
objectified or 
materialized in it” (Marx 305). Therefore, the commodification of labor is
indebted to the labor which contributes to its production and allows for its affordability.
Fundamentally, one must recognize that music is only produced as a result of labor, be it on the
part of the musicmaker and as a result of the various vocations which are required of the music
produced (producer, engineer, PR representative, ect.) Music cannot exist outside of this
relationship to labor because, without some sort of labor, how could a musical work come about?
Heidegger, in my second chapter, will more explicitly relate the labor, the work of the artist, to
commodity, the work of art. Yet, Marx makes explicit on his own that labor is the manifestation
of creative impulse as a kind of work. Not all labor is creative, but all labor engenders a process
of materialization, the result of which is an object which can be given Value.
Calculating the value of labor, which can subsequently be brought into a broader
conversation about Value as a whole, is directly equated to the 
labortime 
required not only to
produce a commodity, but also to afford it. In this way, the monetary equilibrium found between
willingness to accept and willingness to pay is directly resolved as a function of the value of
producer and consumer’s labor. For both the producer and consumer, the economic value of
labor is termed 
wages
. Wages are individually determined in terms of their usevalue, by means
of how proportionally important said labor is to the production of the good. Still, one should
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avoid any confusion as to the relationship between the price of a good and the human labor
power needed to transform material into a commodity. To quote Marx, “with respect to the
usevalue, the labor contained in the commodity counts only qualitatively, with respect to the
magnitude of exchangevalue it counts only quantitatively, after being already reduced to human
labor without further quality” (Marx 311). Therefore, it is not the value of labor which dictates
the exchangevalue of a good, but the exact opposite. Wages are qualitative only insofar as the
labor they represent is presumed useful, but the exchangevalue of the commodity is ultimately
the source of any quantitative economicvalue that labor might have.
This understanding of the quality and quantity of labor can be directly applied to our
attempted distillation of the economic value of music. The quality of music a musicmaker
produces does not directly affect the exchangevalue of said music in the market. More talented
musicmakers will be granted more opportunities to sell their labor as musicmakers. Yet, the
overall economicvalue of recorded music has been previously established. The price of a song,
CD, LP, is relatively set and the expense of producing music must generally fit within a budget
balanced against the limited revenue the music will yield. Certainly, musicmakers also make
questionable financial decisions all the time, paying more to produce a piece of music than the
work will eventually return, but this increased investment nevertheless fails to dictate the price at
which the music will be ultimately sold. There is a market value for a song and an album, and the
only way to justify a more expensive process of music production is to sell a higher quantity, not
quality of music.
Music is, perhaps, unique in its relationship to Marxian laborvalue among the arts. The
large price which an established painter receives for a work is moreso a function of the quality of
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the artist’s labor invested in it. While the price of a painting by an artist with a limited supply of
works will increase the exchangevalue of said works, generally the economic value of a painting
falls back upon the perceived quality of the painter. Thereby, the price of any given painting
vastly fluctuates, ranging anywhere between the $50.00 one might spend on a work on the walls
of a coffee shop or the ~$106,500,000 Picasso’s 
Nude 
legendarily fetched at auction. By
comparison, the music industry fails entirely to take into account this discrepancy in quality. The
best musicians sell a song for the same $.99 that an amateur might. Yes, the better musician
might sell more songs to make up the difference, but the labor itself has a set price and often
sales are not contingent on talent. Instead, musicmakers and their music rely as much on
marketing, trying to appeal to a farreaching audience, as quality because, at the end of the day,
the commodity must be sold in huge quantities in order to receive the financial return that a
painter might receive for a single work.
Quality in the arts is a matter of aesthetics and is best put aside until later in this project.
More integral to the argument put forth in this chapter is how labor and laborer are quantified,
commodified, and ultimately exploited. Explicitly, I am able to address both the economic value
and overarching Value of labor in terms of how wages arise and relate to Marx’s qualms with
capitalism as the system in which economic value and Value are commonly conflated. Marx
states that “Labor produces not only commodities; it produces itself and the worker as a
commodity – and this at the same rate at which it produces commodities in general” (Marx,
Economic Manuscripts of 1844 
71). It is not the goods alone which are materialized by means of
production, but labor, as a function of production, becomes commodified as a service which is
bought and sold. Thereby, said labor becomes detached from the laborer. The laborer is not
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producing exchangevalue in itself, but the market value of the commodity dictates wages of the
laborer. Wages are the exchange value of labor and the laborer becomes merely a component of
the commodity sold. This is a processes of alienation and estrangement, whereby the laborer no
longer has a selfworth independent of productivity and the abstract financial gain this
production might yield. “Labor’s realization is its objectification” as long as any financial gain
for labor is sought (Marx 71).
The musicmaker who avoids selling his or her music avoids the objectification of their
musicmaking, but also fails to yield any sort of economic value which, at this point, is the only
measure by which a greater sense of Value might be understood. Does this mean that
musicmakers themselves lack Value as long as the product of their labor lacks an economic
value? Does Marx provide any means of avoiding this system of devaluation without
compromising any argument about the Value of music? It is my understanding of Marx’s writing
that he does not. The structure of capitalism has isolated the musicmaker from the means to
subsistence so that he or she must enter the working world and commodify their creative output,
or else seek an alternative mode of income to support musicmaking as a hobby.
The music industry, as a capitalist enterprise, determines what it means to be a musician
vocationally. When one seeks employment as a musicmaker, one hopes that the vocation will be
both personally and financially rewarding. Yet, the music industry works against this aspiration.
Most musicians do not even receive a subsistence wage for their musicmaking. Artists signed to
major labels or working as session musicians for larger studios might receive an hourly wage or
salary, but a great number of musicmakers act as their own source of income. In this way, the
musicmaker assumes the responsibility of having to commodify their own labor. The music
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itself is completely devalued outside of what the capitalist invests in its production, an
investment which has significantly decreased in the digital age because MP3s cost nothing to be
reproduced. Subsequently, this devaluation makes the entire music making process alien to the
music maker, who is no longer able to focus on making music and instead is concerned with
making money. The musician is objectified in this purely financial mindset of musicmaking, an
objectification which is completely in keeping with the obsession with materiality which
surrounds the music industry. Therefore, one must wonder how Marx envisions the way in which
the musician might reevaluate his or her role in the music industry so that this alienation is
avoidable. What does Marx’s “communist revolution” offer that is otherwise unaccounted for by
the music industry as we know it? Is this “revolution” only attainable by the means of completely
overthrowing capitalism as a whole, or is it feasible that the microcosm of the music industry
can, will, or is changing on its own to a more ideal economic state for the musician?
To tackle these questions, one must must proceed from the perspective that the economic
devaluation of music could mean the end of music as private property. The fact that music is
made freely available to the public (either pirated or offered by an artist as something free)
removes the artist from the systematic alienation of capitalism through the selfrealization that
their labor is undervalued and objectified. Radiohead allowed their fans to pay what they wanted
for their 2007 album 
In 
Rainbows 
because they understood that the digital files would find their
way onto the web inevitably anyway. The group even monitored the average price at which the
album was selling in case this figure might have dropped too low, but instead the marketing
strategy was a huge success, selling almost two millions physical CDs despite the digital offer
sans expense. Since 2007, websites like Bandcamp have used the paywhatyouwant business
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model to help independent artists offer the possibility of payment for their music without
necessarily deterring fans with a minimum price point. There is instead a negotiation between
artist and fan in which the Value they find in the music is reflected by, but not dependent upon,
the exchange value they pay for it. Thereby, music is seen as having Value outside of the
equation of supply, demand, and profit. The determination of Value relegated to the producer
and consumer alone. The musicmaker might seek additional sources of income to supplement
the production of music through tangible goods like tshirts, concerts, and beer coozies, but it is
up to the consumer to determine the ways in which they want to support the musician, either by
buying their music or their merchandise. To this extent, the music industry has begun to return to
a system of patronage, but this time appealing to public patrons rather than seeking a Medici or
Habsburg to cover the entirety of subsistence from a single source.
The abolition of music as private property is apparent not only from the perspective of
how musicians now market themselves and their music to make a living, but is also related to
returning the private means of production to the hands of the musician. During the heyday of the
music industry, musicians relied on capital from record labels to afford expensive studio time
with producers and engineers, not to mention all of the paid auxiliaries that are involved in the
marketing and distribution of music. Therefore, the musicians needed the industry to make an
impact in the industry (unless they were able to somehow fund the production themselves). Now,
however, one can seemingly circumvent this system. One does not need a studio to record music:
all one needs is a microphone, a personal computer, and talent. The bedroom popstar, one who is
able to use their own private means and talent to establish a career is a reality. This state of
affairs even transcends genre, allowing bands, rappers, and electronic musicians alike to record,
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produce, and promote their music without considering the economic viability of their enterprise
and without the need for capital for this enterprise to exist. Thereby, the alienation and
objectification of capitalism are forsaken for favor of musicmakers who can and do produce
music themselves, because it matters to them and because they have the means to make it.
With Marx in mind, how might we now define the Value of music? One can no longer
point to specific costs which set a price for the supply and demand of music. The supply of
music in the digital age is infinite, yet the Value of this infinite supply can still be said to exist.
Exchangevalue, from the standpoint of a producer, is completely undercut, yet a willingness to
pay on the part of the consumer remains. Therefore, a Marxist analysis of the music world is
increasingly relevant to a conversation about Value because capitalist valuations prove to
superfluous to the valuations informed by musicians and listeners.
Marx's model makes sense of Value because understands economic value fails to
accurately Value music or labor. In recognizing this failure, he shows how the music industry
can and has developed to a point where we can look at Value outside of economics
. One should
not think of music strictly in the sense of it being a commodity, but must take the implications of
music as a commodity as the starting point for a discussion of Value Value which
acknowledges subjective opinion and remains fair to the musicians. Music is made by artists, not
laborers, and the arts have always been problematic for economists. Thus, the following chapter
will consider the Value of music sans economic value, and the final chapter will be dedicated to
resolving economic value and noneconomic Value as affected by reproduction. Ultimately, the
economic viability of being a musician affects the way that Value of music is defined, but be
aware that this economic value is not commensurate with Value.
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II
Work, Value, and Origin
Who decides to become a musicmaker because of the money? Is financial reward the
validation that every musicmaker seeks? Dreams of being a musicmaker might emerge during
one’s adolescence as a result of a naive fascination with fame. Madonna wears an elegant gown
on a red carpet and preteens across the nation envy and aspire to share to the same limelight.
Television, radio, print and digital media all reinforce the notion that mainstream financial
success is possible, but the legitimacy of musicmaking as a practical profession often falls short.
The idea of popstardom is a myth. The number of unsuccessful musicmakers greatly exceeds
the number that do succeed famously and financially and an artist with any foresight whatsoever
knows the risk. They are aware of the laborious grind required before any potential economic
reward, if ever, is received. So, one must ask again: Who decides to be a musicmaker because of
the money? As outlined in the previous chapter, the Value of musicmaking is not dependant
upon the economic outcome. So, 
if economic value fails to determine Value one knows it to
possess, where and how else might one discover a definition of the Value of music?
In an oped published in the 
Huffington Post 
in 2011 entitled “I Love My Job, But It
Made Me Poorer,” author JD Samson outlines how their career as a musician has effectively
ruined their economic stability. Samson outlines the many parts they have played within the
music industry, including primary roles in two criticallyacclaimed bands (Le Tigre and MEN),
as well as DJing, remixing other artists’ works, and even writing material to be performed by the
likes of Christina Aguilera. Yet, despite their ability to assume various occupations available
within the music industry, Samson still worries about health insurance, dental plans, and having
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enough savings to sustain their lifestyle as a musicmaker not only now, but by the time they are
eighty years old.
Whereas other vocations focus on a salary and 401(k), the musicmaker forgos these
concerns in favor of doing what they love. In one anecdote, Samson describes being denied a
number of crusty, roachinfested apartments in Brooklyn because they lacked a stable income. In
Samson’s own words, realtors and landlords don’t “give a shit about how kids email me all the
time thanking me for keeping them from committing suicide. It's not part of [their] capitalist
business practice” (Samson). The musicmaker, to this extent, skirts the conventional route of
paychecks and vacation days in favor of what? “We live in a society where people equate
success with money,” but the two are drastically different. It is an equation which misleads
children who see a musicmaker on TV performing or being interviewed into assuming that they
are being reasonably, if not excessively, paid for their artistic labor. It is an equation which
deems all of the musicmakers who died penniless as being unsuccessful, despite being
potentially revered during and after their lifetimes. Most importantly, it is an equation which
confuses economic value for Value and truncates any potential for a more profound
understanding of the Value of their work.
In the previous chapter, we considered the economic perils of any profession in the
capitalist system in which Value is reducible to exchange and use. The aim of this chapter,
however, is to reexamine what is meant by Value outside Marx’s framework. Where
“objectivity” fails the musicmaker, one must fill in the gaps with subjective worth,
understanding that usevalue is not a matter of exchange exclusively. 
Use is a reflection of
preference and personal investment; 
use is a function of the supplier’s and demander’s wants and
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needs, including subjective criteria which cannot always be given a price tag. Although the
Value of music must take into account the implications of economics, Martin Heidegger, as we
will see, discusses the importance of art extensively without addressing the economics at all. He
allows the artist and the work of art, representing the musicmaker and the music made, to
provide an internal justification for their own being, and one must understand that this being
itself is valuable. In Heidegger’s writing, the Value of art reveals itself. Using 
The Origin of the
Work of Art
, this chapter will endeavor to elucidate the Value of music and musicmaking from
the perspective that art, and music as a subcategory thereof, is essential to the being of those that
seek to produce and consume it.
At first, the choice to juxtapose Heidegger with Marx might appear odd. The opposite of
economic value in the arts seems more aptly equated with philosophical writings on aesthetic
value. For example, in the 
Critique of Judgement
, Kant ostensibly distances himself from any
economic valuations of art with the assertion that beautiful art, art that can be said to have some
sort of aesthetic value, must possess beauty regardless of the audience's’ “interest” in the work.
Kant is obviously not saying that the work isn’t interesting in the sense that it bores the viewer,
but “interest,” as Kant uses it, “always has connection to the faculty of desire” (Kant 38). In this
sense, when one is interested in an object, one desires that object because it can fulfill a function
that is also desired. One buys a toothbrush or lawnmower because one wants to brush one’s teeth
or mow one’s lawn. Yet, “the judgement of taste can be determined by no representation of an
objective purpose... because it is an aesthetical and not a cognitive judgement” (Kant 56).
Beautiful art does not fulfill a desire or function that allows the audience to enjoy it. There is no
reasoning 
which makes one work beautiful and another not. By contrast, “when the question is if
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a thing is beautiful, we do not want to know whether anything depends or can depend upon the
existence of the thing, either for myself or for anyone else, but how we judge it by mere
observation” (Kant 38). Thus, the work of art does not mow your lawn or clean your teeth
fulfilling a practical function. Through observation alone, art gives way to a feeling of beauty
which lends aesthetic value to the work. Music is not purchased merely because one needs
something to listen to, but because the sensation that the music evokes is positive. In this way,
aesthetics prove antithetical to usevalue economics in that art is not explicitly useful outside of
observation and contemplation.
Nevertheless, the music industry, as well as every other competitive art industry,
continues to sell these things these objects of observation and contemplation. In part, these sales
can be attributed to the beauty of the objects in question, but visual works of art also prove useful
as investments. People make money by buying paintings and sculptures at low prices and selling
them when their value soars, like they would with stock shares or real estate. Clearly, these
investors are purchasing works because they believe that someone might think of it as beautiful,
but aesthetics only remains pertinent as long as this value is correlated to the economic value a
potential buyer might pay for it. Moreover, musicmakers themselves become ‘investments’ they
are picked up by a label or publicist with the prospect of their ability to make music which sells.
Aesthetic value, by these means, ends up being reduced to economic value. Beauty is made
desirable and the creation, curation, and collection of its material representations becomes goods
for money instead of being appreciated for aesthetic value as an end in itself.
Yet, Kant should not be subjected to Marxist theory frivolously. Aesthetic appeal must be
accounted for, given its due Value outside of its relationship to an economic purpose. Therefore,
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one must seek a method of determining the Value of art which is not only opposed to the
problematic, economic valuations of the previous chapter, but also accounts for aesthetic
valuations such as Kant’s. To this extent Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological framework in
The Origin of the Work of Art not only outlines the grounds upon which any economic or
aesthetic demarcation of value can be based, but also advances a way of thinking about the Value
of art which has thus far only been proximally defined. How exactly does Heidegger eschew
both Marx and Kant in his thinking about art and how does this thinking apply to music
specifically? How can Heidegger be said to be discussing Value at all when the concept of
‘value’ only appears in passing within his work?
In beginning to reveal what 
The Origin of the Work of Art 
has 
to say about Value, it is
essential to understand how Heidegger defines the word 
origin and how the being of art and the
Value thereof is dependent upon, if not inextricable from, an origin. Specifically, Heidegger
states that “origin here means that from and by which something is what it is” (Heidegger,
Origin 17). Within the context of 
The Origin of the Work of Art
, Heidegger is already presenting
the grounds for an examination of Art in terms of its being, how it 
is
. A work of art only “is”
because it has an origin. The “from” and “by which” represent the origin both in terms of
location, i.e., the “from” drawn from a “there,” and instrumentation, the “by which” representing
the means to its “is.” It is only when there is an origin, location and instrumentation, that a work
of art can be brought into being. If the Value of music is to be given this Heideggerian treatment,
then one must admit that said Value has an origin of its own that is necessarily implied or else
this Value 
is not
.
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Kant might have qualms with the assertion that the value or beauty of a work of art has 
to
be
, stating that “in saying [a work of art] is beautiful and in showing that I have taste, I am
concerned, not with that in which I depend on the existence of the object, but with that which I
make out of the representation myself” (Kant 39). One should not take this statement about the
existence of an object being removed from aesthetic value as declaring art objects imaginary.
Instead, Kant describes the observation, “making out the representation myself,” as that which is
independent of the object, not imagined, but felt. Thereby, the origin of the Value of art takes
shape out of the interaction between the work of art, as the “by which” or means to the valuation,
and the audience as the “from” that gives rise to, experiences, and appreciates the Value.
Although external factors can affect how anyone might place value in a work of art, the work of
art must be valuable in the first place. If one imagines a song which can be given a price tag, let
alone thought of as beautiful, there must first be a song and someone to hear it. Only with both
elements in play can a valuation be made  aesthetic, economic, or otherwise.
What is, then, the origin of the work of art? Specifically, Heidegger describes the origin
as stemming from an interaction between a work of art and the artist working. In order to
understand the Value of the work, these factors must be considered. To this end, Heidegger states
that “The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without
the other” (Heidegger 17). Primarily, this assertion stresses the circular relationship that
something has with its ‘origin.’ In everyday language, origin commonly refers to a single starting
point, a starting line, a place of birth, and a single point on the axis of a graph. For Heidegger,
however, origin implies interdependence which gives rise to something new. In this sense, the
“from” of the artwork is attributable to the artist insofar as the artist is a “there” from which work
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can arise. The artist is the active agent engaged in the working. Although Heidegger does not
describe the artist as “Dasein” explicitly, readers of 
Being and Time 
will relate any Heideggerian
individual, such as the artist, to Dasein as defined by “sein” (being) and “da” (there). This
“there” of Dasein is the “da” of the artist, accounting for the locational “from” of its origin.
Furthermore, 
work
, as one of the many activities of Dasein not addressed in 
Being and Time
,
functions as the “by which” an artist can come into being. The working is the means of artistic
expression, the means of creating. To this extent, a work of art, despite being seemingly
selfevident in its name, is the culmination of the existence of an 
artist working
, and neither the
work nor the artist as points of origin can be removed from this equation for the artwork
“neither is without the other.”
From a Heideggerian perspective, how does Value develop out of the the ‘artist working’
as an aspect of its origin? Even before Value can be addressed as an unspoken aspect of
Heidegger’s work, one must understand 
art
. Within the discussion of the artist and his or her
working, a third component remains that “is prior to both” and is “the origin of both artist and art
work” (Heidegger 17). In this respect, art is the forestructure or basis upon which the being of
art and work rely. Art is not merely a mode of interpretation, but in fact makes the world of art
possible, for both the work of art and observers thereof. Heidegger briefly concedes that art “is
nothing more than a word to which nothing real corresponds” (Heidegger 17). In this aside,
much like Kant, Heidegger is not stating that art does not exist since works of art are examples of
art. Instead, Heidegger is referencing the fact that one cannot abstract art from works of art just
like one cannot understand Value without using objects which hold value. Art cannot escape its
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role as a forestructure since any questions about a work or artist must refer back to something
which establishes the possibility for either to exist.
It could be argued that Value joins the trifecta of art, artist, and working, but only
because the Value of art could never arise independently of the artworld and the people and
practices that contribute to it. Yet, as any discussion of art is advanced, one will have to come to
grips with why the artist works and how this work relates back to something which can be
considered art. In order to address the function of art more directly within 
The Origin of the
Work of Art
, Heidegger uses the example of the temple to represent the greater function of art
and the difficulty of attributing a work of art to any single cause. Initially, the temple is
introduced in the context of belonging “uniquely to the realm that is opened up by itself”
(Heidegger 40). This remark is in keeping with the reflexive, middlevoiced German which is
pervasive across Heidegger’s work. In this passive voicing, the idea of something, such as a
work of art, opening up the realm in which it exists for and by itself also speaks to the
“circularity” of Being. Heidegger is clarifying that a temple, as a work of art, is conceived and
perceived as a work of art because something called ‘art’ has the ability to do something called
‘work.’ The selfevidence of the work of art being defined by the ‘work’ it does as ‘art’ is not
merely a linguistic similarity, but is an indication of something internal and necessary to the
“opening up” it is said to do “by itself.”
Again, Heidegger’s declarations might seem redundant, but by introducing “opening up”
as a function of art, one is led closer to what art 
does 
and how this ‘doing’ becomes a source of
Value. Thereby, a temple in its Being allows for its Being and goes so far as to reveal, through its
“opening up by itself,” ways of understanding this Being. Heidegger goes on to say that “the
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templework standing there opens up a world and at the same time sets the world back again on
earth, which thus only emerges as native ground” (Heidegger 41). Earth, in this sense, is thought
of as the origin of the temple in that the stability of the temple requires the stability of the earth
beneath it in a physical sense. Still, the function of the temple is the opening up of a world and
one cannot ignore the opening of the world as an activity “by which” the temple can be thought
of as a temple. If the temple merely relied on the earth, it would fail as a temple. A work of art is
only manifested through its opening of a world 
and its setting back into earth. Without either the
earth or world at play, the temple loses the possibility of being interpreted or understood. The
work of art loses its purpose. When a work of art loses its purpose, it loses an element
constitutive of art. Can it therefore be said to have a Being at all?
As long as Value relies on the work of art, the work of art must reside on the earth and in
the world because the existence of one is inextricable from the other. Instead of focusing on the
logical impossibility of a work of art without an origin, one must bring into question the
interaction between the 
world and the 
earth as the means of interpreting the temple,
understanding the being of art, and how this interpretation and understanding finally leads to
defining something called Value. To this end, Heidegger states that “earth juts through the world
and world grounds itself on the earth only so far as truth happens as the primal conflict between
clearing and concealing” (Heidegger 54). Evidently, the dual function of the temple as an
opening and a grounding relates to this conflict of clearing and concealing insofar as the earth is
related to concealment and the world to clearing, openness. There is a contradiction in the
conceptualization of simultaneous clearing and concealing, but this contradiction is not
selfdefeating. It is instead defined as the happening of “truth,” admittedly a conflict, but
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necessary nonetheless. For example, one might admit that, abstractly, nature and society stand in
opposition to each other, but this opposition does not negate the existence of either. Instead, man
only understands nature as the ground upon which society is constructed and society is only
realized as it distances itself from nature. The two cannot be without the other despite the
conflict that arises between them.
What does this conflict say about Value? Conflict is not to disparage Heidegger’s
methodology of interdependence, but instead acknowledges that circular logic, a cycle of
clearing and concealing, is inherently irksome and that this irking serves a purpose to the reader,
here defined as “the happening of truth.” As truth happens, by means of a work of art existing in
conflict with itself, both the artist’s and audience’s association with the work becomes apparent
as contributing to and reflecting upon truth. Heidegger reinforces the importance of truth as a
consequence the work of art by indicating that this truth, as a mode of understanding, is the
origin of art, the basis of its being. Heidegger directly asserts that in “setting up a world and
setting forth the earth, the work is the fighting of the battle in which the unconcealedness of
being, as a whole, or truth, is won” (
Origin 54). A work of art resides in conflict, but the
outcome is final, a potential resolution to the overarching problem of Value. Whereas Marx and
Kant allow for interpretations of value with selective applications, Heidegger advances ‘truth’ as
the primordial function of art, both as invaluable to and ultimately establishing of that Value to
which both economic and aesthetic valuations must refer. This is not to say, however, that the
battle ends in acknowledging that truth and Value emerge in this way. This conflict will always
remain a function of the artwork and to say that 
unconcealedness is won by the very nature of
this conflict occurring indicates that 
truth is conflict
for both art and Value.
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Truth, outside of its relationship with conflict, still remains amorphous in terms of its
connection to something one would refer to as Value. Heidegger states that “Truth is the essence
of the true,” and from this association one might conclude that, similarly, Value is the essence of
all value, but “what do we have in mind when we are speaking of essence?” (Heidegger 49)
There is a connection between truth and Value as concepts pertaining to those works of art which
are referred to being true or valuable, but how does Heidegger define truth? How might he define
Value? Heidegger clarifies his thinking about truth by declaring that “the essence is discovered
in a generic and universal concept, which represents the one feature that holds indifferently for
many things” (Heidegger 49). By these means, truth and Value are not merely a linguistic
extension of the true or the valuable, but these terms are meant to signify that feature of the work
of art which is ubiquitous, binding, and selfdefinitional. Like beauty for Kant, truth is meant to
represent a quality that a work of art possesses regardless of ‘interest’ or practical application.
Truth at its essence is an origin insofar as all works of art can are reducible to something
called art, within which there is a conflict and out of which truth and Value emerge. Both the
artist working and the audience reflecting thereupon are individually endowed with the power to
bestow, dictate, or argue the relative relevance of the Value which can be interpreted with the
work. To this extent, disagreements naturally arise out of the discontinuity of the artist’s
interpretation of his or her work with that of the audience, or even within the audience itself. Yet,
even these subjective fluctuations cannot deny the possibility or being of Value. Without Value,
there could be no economic or aesthetic disagreement. Refuting or defending the beauty or price
of a work of music only reinforces that the music has some sort of Value to which these
arguments refer.
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Thus far, Heidegger has provided the means to define Value as that which supports and
opens up the world of aesthetic and economic value. The word Value is more commonly
associated with the latter two valuations because aesthetic and economic valuations can be seen
and understood in everyday application. Value, in isolation however, does not require that the
work of art be given a price tag or be considered beautiful. Instead, Value is an origin, rooted in
the artist as creator and audience as consumer, upon which all other valuations must rely. In this
way, Value reveals itself as a concept closely related to Heidegger’s definition of truth, an
inalienable quality which all works of art must contain. Both truth and Value can be said to result
from a conflict that a work of art must simultaneously clear and conceal. The earth buries both
truth and Value beneath the surface of the work while the world and the associations thereof
attempt to uncover it. If the work was not in part concealed in the first place, then both truth and
Value would be absent. Both truth and Value require an uncovering, a working on the part of
both artist and audience to reveal what lies beyond the surface of the work.
Although 
The Origin of the Work of Art 
does not address authenticity to the extent that
Being and Time 
does, there is a palpable relationship between truth and authenticity. Truth is
always related to Dasein by means of ‘understanding’ and ‘interpretation.’ Understanding always
presupposes truth and interpretation serves to articulate this truth into and out of understanding.
Dasein, however, does not become or happen truthfully in the way that a work of art does. When
I look in the mirror I do not see Dasein, I see me. A painting of oneself is closer to a portrait of
Dasein than a reflection because a painting requires inquiry, whereas one can so easily forget
oneself in oneself. Dasein, gets caught up in the everyday, in what Heidegger describes as
inauthentic Being, and ignores the truth about Being that is revealed the very Being of Dasein.
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Art, on the other hand, is anything but the everyday, and “artwork is the substructure into and
upon which the other, authentic, element is built” (Heidegger 20). Dasein seeks authentic being,
and if artwork is the substructure, the foreconception, or the origin of an element of authenticity,
The Origin of the Work of Art reveals a mode of Being through the work of art which Dasein
must find valuable. A work of art is valuable in serving as a source of reflection and inquiry that
builds an understanding about art and Being. A work of art invites its audience to seek truth
within its openness to interpretation and understanding which lies beneath it and arises out of it.
The work of art is nothing beyond this attempt at understanding, beyond this conflict, and
ultimately frees revelations about the truth of Being from Dasein as concerned with and over
involved in its Being.
Therefore, the Value of the work of art is found to be a reflection of the capacity of art to
convey authentic Being and truth, offering a viewpoint into the existence of the artist working as
it relates, effectively or not, to an audience member’s own experience, the 
Being of beings
. In
fact, authenticity is a term already used in the art world, although its application somewhat
distinct from the authenticity described by Heidegger. Often, musicians are called inauthentic if
their work appears to be disingenuous, either arising or reflecting an element of his or her life
that is fictitious or embellished. Critics use the word ‘sellout’ to describe and
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musicians and works which appear as a result of corporate sponsorship or attempted mainstream
success. As the first chapter of the project addresses, it is increasingly difficult to make a living
as a musician, potentially encouraging artists to make work from an inauthentic place and forgo
Value for economic value. Still, is it not possible to make money off a work without
compromise? Should not authenticity appeal to listeners? Are there not examples of artists who
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have stayed true to themselves and have been rewarded for it? In conclusively defining the Value
of music, one must be wary of how Value is preserved and destroyed by the creative means and
mindset behind the work in terms of authenticity as well as marketability.
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III
Reproducer
Thus far, the Value of music has been discussed, but not fully defined. There is a sense
that Value is different from a price tag and undoubtedly separate once the music is excised from
the confines of commodification. Moreover, on a metaphysical level, Value is seen as a part of
what makes art work. Value is related to the truth that the work must possess as a result of the
artist working. Moreover, on an aesthetic level, the very interaction with an audience able to
respond to the work allows for Value to be realized outside of the artist’s creative input alone.
Value persists as long as it is thought to be valuable by someone. Yet, Heidegger’s analysis of art
highlights 
how Value 
is rather than 
what it is. Marx removed the conversation because
Heidegger remains so focused on origins over the realworld ramifications thereof. One could be
a Heideggerian scholar and still remain illequipped to make a living as a musicmaker in the
face of an industry failing to recognize 
what 
ultimately 
defines the Value of music. Therefore,
one must reconcile Value on a metaphysical level with the way in which a work of music is
thought of and invested in as ‘valuable’ for producer and consumer. In order to best describe the
interaction and potential resolution of metaphysical Value and economic value, I will consult
Walter Benjamin’s 
The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction as an examination of
how Marx and Heidegger align, once given the modern contextual framework of reproduction.
Benjamin, unlike Marx or Heidegger, provides an ontology for the work of art that resides in
materiality without abandoning the aesthetic power of perception. Thereby, Benjamin will
complete the definition of Value that is sought at the onset of this project, an interpretation which
reifies why one would want to be a musicmaker at all and how music is able to retain Value.
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Initially, it should be said that 
The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction
focuses on the worlds of painting, drama, film and photography, not music. Yet, there are clear
connections between visual and auditory mediums. Music is not exempt from a greater
conversation about music. Instead, one will see that music, like film, is a popular artform that
relies on reproducibility. Specifically, for Benjamin, the fact that music has become
mechanically reproducible in the 20th century and infinitely so in the 21st century relates
directly to the diminishing authenticity, authority, or 
aura of music in 
The Work of Art in the Age
of Mechanical Reproduction
. Yet, Benjamin’s pessimism is not irreconcilable with an updated
identification of the Value of music. Reproducibility is the fundamental mode by which music is
modernly consumed, the recorded music possessing an aura of its own in the face of its
dematerialization. Not only does the reproducibility of music meet its audience “halfway” in that
the audience can bring a live experience of music home with them, but to experience this music
at home, in the car, or on the person through headphones at any time, is not to diminish the
experience of the music, but 
is that very experience. Many musicmakers are recording artists
because the song and the album have a far wider reach than they could physically travel at a
fraction of the cost. The recorded product, the reproduction, is integral to how music works and
should be given more credit as a creative act in and of itself rather than merely being a means
mass production. The point of this chapter is to examine Benjamin’s concept of “aura” and
consider whether it can still be captured in today state of musical production. Moreover, “aura”
will be compared with “exhibition” and “ritual” value, as described by Benjamin, insofar as all
three relate to the Value that this entire project attempts to define.
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To further this study, one should examine how Benjamin approaches the greater
discussion of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. In the nascency of Benjamin's argument,
he sights the various modes which have culminated in the reproducibility of art today. First,
Benjamin cites that, in antiquity, “bronzes, terra cottas, and coins were the only art works which
they could produce in quantity. All others were unique and could not be mechanically
reproduced” (Benjamin 218). The reproducibility of these objects was dependent on the making
of molds. The molds made these products reproducible to the extent that the molds could be
repeatedly reused. Therefore, two Roman homes could have the same bronze sculptures or could
be adorned with the same clay figurines as long as the mold was preserved. The example of coins
which Benjamin raises, however, is the most interesting one. 
Money is not often thought of as a
work of art and its reproducibility is the very essence of its Value. If there is a single work on the
market, the worth of this work becomes solely based on the valuation of the individual willing to
pay the most for the work. Yet, if the work is reproduced, the value of each reproduction begins
to settle towards the average consumer’s willingness to pay for each subsequent reproduction.
Specifically, as more coins are produced, the less each coin is worth. Coinage represents the
standardization of Value to the fullest extent, whereby so many of these “works” are produced
that the coins themselves establish a standard by which other items are valued. Therefore, the
aura, or Value, of the coin is directly degraded by means of its reproduction, and must be
considered independent of economic valuation alone.
Leaving behind the reliance of monetary systems on reproducibility, Benjamin goes on to
talk about how the reproduction of works of art greatly accelerated with the inventions of the
printing press to reproduce text and lithography to reproduce images. Specifically, he states that
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“Lithography enabled graphic art to illustrate everyday life, and it began to keep pace with
printing. But only a few decades after its invention, lithography was surpassed by photography”
(Benjamin 219). In this sense, the reproduction of written and visual arts went handinhand,
providing the medium for newspapers and magazines. These mediums are debatably depicting
works of art on their own, but the writing and imagery contained within are the sort of artworks
which inherently require reproduction and distribution. For Benjamin, there is nothing unique
about the works contained within magazines and newspapers. Yet, the value of these works
comes with the nature of being mass produced and consumed in a way that singular copies of
these works never could have been. Therefore, one is presented with the necessary reconciliation
of originality, uniqueness, with the possibility of distribution. Depending on one’s role in the art
world, one might be critical of commercial photographers, illustrators, and designers who make
work specifically for use in printed media. Although these critiques might generally be
concerned with the artist’s willingness to compromise creativity for commercial interests, this is
a similar critique to that which is leveled by Benjamin that all works that rely on reproduction
change “the reaction of the masses towards the art” (Benjamin 234). If a work is meant to appeal
to the masses, as a mode of advertising or documentation, the work is viewed differently then
when the artist is making the work for themselves or a small audience, with the onus to view and
appreciate the work is put on the masses.
For Benjamin, reproduced art is viewed differently than singular, original works. A
painting in a gallery will be more effective than a reproduction in a magazine or book.
Photography, by these very terms, is always reproduced, from frame to negative to print, and
cannot have the aura of the scene depicted. Unlike lithography and printingpresses,
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photography, “for the first time, the process of pictorial reproduction... freed the hand of the most
important artistic functions which henceforth devolved only upon the eye looking into a lens”
(Benjamin 219). Here, Benjamin is starting to criticize the way in which a reproduction affects
the Value of the work. The “hand is freed” by the camera and one merely relies on the ability to
look through a lense to capture a representation of reality. Thereby, an important artistic function
is lost. Visual arts prior to photography required a creative reinterpretation of what the artist sees,
the lens of the eye less reliable than that of the camera. The translation from sight to hand must
run through the brain as an interpretive element. Yet, photography does this seeing for the artist.
Photography in many ways marked the end of painting’s pursuit of realism because the
photograph presents an approximate reality, both in terms of proportion and perspective, which
cannot be disputed. Photography is evidence, whereas a painting is interpretive, depicting an
artistic reaction to reality rather than reality itself.
Benjamin's discussion of photography immediately leads to an idyllic picture of the
future of the consumption of art. Quoting French poet and essayist Paul Valery, Benjamin
suggests that “Just as water, gas, and electricity are brought into our houses from far off to
satisfy our needs in response to a minimal effort, so we shall be supplied with visual or auditory
images, which will appear and disappear at a simple movement of the hand” (Benjamin 219).
Even though television was fairly primitive when this work was published in 1936, this quote
predicts the convenience of home entertainment systems. Cable TV and internet are modern
utilities just as water, gas, and electricity, but their function is to provide amusement as
compared to these more necessary creature comforts. Moreover, prophetically, control over the
distribution of visual and auditory artwork into the home is managed by a simple movement of

43

the hand over a remote control which has the ability to change the art consumed and as well as
controlling its appearance and disappearance by means of a power button. In fact, as of the 21st
century, visual and auditory imagery is not only controlled by the hand, but is located in the
hand. One is able to watch a film or listen to music from a phone, a tool which has extended the
reproduction of art to the point of being able to take reproductions of artwork almost anywhere.
As previously mentioned, the fact that art has reached this stage of reproducibility is
idyllic in the sense that a phone allows one to personally choose what artwork one carries at all
times, as well as acting as a portal to view or hear almost any work of art at almost any time or
place. Yet, there is undoubtedly something lost when one watches a movie on a phone. The
screen is squished and the playback stops and starts unless one has access to an extremely
highspeed internet connection. Experiencing a movie in a cinema offers so much more in the
way of providing an experience that fills the visual and auditory field. The same can be said for
viewing a work of visual art on the internet. One is removed from an upclose analysis, seeing
the work as it has been originally embodied. This causes a degradation of the work of art through
the reproduction and redistribution, a testament to the loss of an aura of which Benjamin
attributes to technological advancement. Yet, does this same sort of degradation occur for
recorded music when it is made available by means of reproduction?
Benjamin, mostly likely, would have thought that music would suffer the same fate as
visual arts like photography and film. To this extent, Benjamin asserts that “even the most
perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its
unique existence at the place where it happens to be” (Benjamin 220). Although this lack is not
defined as an aura just yet, one can see by this definition how the actual occurrence art relates to
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the technological distribution and consumption of art. Even if a work is perfectly replicated, it
still is a recreation without a time or place, without a unique occurrence of its own. If a work is
everywhere, it does not have a presence unto itself, but is omnipresent. Therefore, work, in being
reproduced, is removed from “the changes which it may have suffered in physical condition over
the years as well as the various changes in its ownership. The traces of the first can be revealed
only by chemical or physical analyses which it is impossible to perform on a reproduction;
changes of ownership are subject to a tradition which must be traced from the situation of the
original” (Benjamin 220). Herein, Benjamin is insisting that a reproduced work of art is without
the history that makes a work of art itself. In a Heideggerian sense, the reproduced work of art is
without an origin. The production does not have the defining characteristics of the original, in
that it is a physical thing over time that changes hands. A picture of the 
Mona Lisa 
is available to
everyone over the internet, on tshirts, or even stationary, but the painting itself is in the Louvre
and only as a visitor to the museum can one see the blemishes which have been sustained in the
work’s paint over time, as well as, for example, how surprisingly small the portrait is. Moreover,
there is a sense that being in the presence of the ‘real’ 
Mona Lisa affirms the existence of all the
reproductions one has encountered. There is a history to the painting and those that view it are
able to participate in the history. Everyone has seen the 
Mona Lisa
, but only those who have
viewed it in person have truly experienced the work and have been in the presence of its aura.
Can musical recordings, by comparison, ever be said to have such a distinct time and
place? Some might say that recordings exist outside of time and space by the very fact that
recorded music is not visible outside the medium (cd, vinyl, cylinder, or MP3) used to reproduce
it and that now, as something digital, it can be accessed or taken anywhere at any time. Benjamin
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was not writing at a time when this was the case in terms of the accessibility of music, but still
addresses this accessibility explicitly by stating that “technical reproduction can put the copy of
the original into situations which would be out of reach for the original itself. Above all, it
enables the original to meet the beholder halfway, be it in the form of a photograph or a
phonograph record... the choral production, performed in an auditorium or in the open air,
resounds in the drawing room” (Benjamin 220). Clearly, Benjamin is not denying the capabilities
of the reproduction to be accessed. He is, however, suggesting that a mitigation of quality takes
place between a performance of music and the recording of it. This was especially true at the
time Benjamin was writing because there was a literal degradation which took place when the
performance was put on wax and recreated in the living room. Thus, it makes sense for Benjamin
to claim, even of music, that “the presence of the original” the performance “is the
prerequisite to the concept of authenticity” (Benjamin 220) A recording was convenient and
entertaining but, with recordings of the time, “the whole sphere of authenticity is outside
technical – and, of course, not only technical – reproducibility” (Benjamin 220).
Can the same be said of the music that is recorded today? Even in punk parlance, people
who record music are not inauthentic by default. There is no direct scrutiny of artists recording in
general. Musicmaking, for many musicmakers, is a process of music production and inevitable
reproduction. Still, in terms of recorded music, Benjamin’s argument about the aura and
authenticity is comprehensible in relation to the era in which he was writing. Recorded music
would not have been spatial or temporal in same sense that a concert happens at a time and a
place, and the quality of the music was audibly worsened in the reproduction. Yet, the modern
album does not necessarily capture a live performance. Recording technology has allowed songs
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to be recorded in bits and pieces, at a far higher quality than ever, and with an unlimited amount
of overdubs to supplement what is never possible to capture live. Therefore, the recording often
sounds better than the live performance the levels are mastered and a performer can repeatedly
record a section until the take is perfect. In this way, the recording assumes the role of the
original and subsequent performances of recorded material try to replicate the recording, actively
becoming the reproduction. The Beatles went so far as to choose to never perform live as a group
once the recordings became impossible to recreate in the open air of a stadium. Benjamin
probably could not have foreseen the paradigm shift of recorded music assuming the role of the
original, but, retrospectively, one can examine the way in which music has conquered some of
the problems related to art in the age of mechanical reproduction.
Having pieced together that which gives recorded music a time and a place, one is able to
address the authority and aura of recorded music can have. Explicitly, one can see that a musical
recording has a time and a place insofar as an album is recorded somewhere and over some
period of time. Both the time taken and the space in which it was recorded are made present
when one listens back to the recording. Every room adds an ambiance, a specific resonance and
reflection. Each studio contains a unique combination of equipment (instruments, interfaces,
compressors, consoles) that influences how the music turns out. Moreover, the duration of the
recording process is generally reflected in the way the music sounds, whether it was rushed,
overproduced, or perfectly executed. Recorded music does have an explicit character in time
and space; it is not a reproduction of a moment, but is the amalgamation of all the time and space
occupied by those people and things that are required to ultimately produce the record. It is this
original entity which becomes transmissible through reproduction. Benjamin states that “the
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authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from
its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced” (Benjamin 221).
In this sense, a musical recording is a testament, a transmission of an essence existing from the
beginning of the recording process to the end, a fulfillment of an origin. This explicitly
differentiates music from traditional arts which contain their history in their physical presence.
Instead, music captures and reproduces the history and happening which came before it,
amalgamating in what is eventually heard and distributed. This happening is reproduced, yes, but
the original is perfectly preserved, in so far as what one hears the unique time and place the
musicmaker found to record it.
How does the claim that the aura of recorded music can be preserved then relate to a way
in which one might ultimately define the Value of music? One must address the way in which
Benjamin brings his own uses of ‘value’ into the conversation. Specifically, Benjamin states that
“works of art are received and valued on different planes” (Benjamin 224). Although Benjamin
is concerned with aura as a source of Value primarily, he is also cognisant of economic,
aesthetic, and even metaphysical valuations which lead to the general assumption that Value
might ultimately be subjective. Benjamin keeps the conversation around the Value of music alive
despite the different ways in which Value, as a term, is used. Particularly, Benjamin is concerned
with two predominant and polarized types of value  ‘cult’ and ‘exhibition’  which come to
represent and influence an individual’s valuations. Neither cult nor exhibition value provide a
full explanation of the Value my investigation. attempts define. Instead, these terms function as
alternative narratives to the sort of Value which has been previously associated with Heidegger
and Marx.
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Benjamin initially asserts that all art originated in terms of ritual and, thereby, all art is
indebted to its ‘cult’ value. Specifically, he states that “artistic production begins with
ceremonial objects destined to serve in a cult” (Benjamin 224). This position is perhaps drawn
from uncited historical evidence that all early works of art are in someway religious, but the
power of the statement should not be mitigated because it lacks a specific source. In stating that
artistic production is ceremonial is merely an acknowledgement that early artists were not
motivated to make art because of a market, or because they knew what ‘art’ was. Instead, the
ceremonial element speaks to Kant’s theory of disinterest, in that early instances of works of art
began out of the need to produce a representation of their world, not create an object that has a
physical or tangible purpose. One might argue that certain crafts like pottery and woven objects
have a practical function and maintain aesthetically pleasing elements, but these objects have
only become art because they have retrospectively been put on display and denied their natural
context. It is only those works that are purely ornamental that can be said to have cult value and
understood as works of art for the sake of themselves. Benjamin goes on to state that “one may
assume that what mattered was their existence, not their being in view” (Benjamin 225).
Thereby, the cult value can be understood as having an aspect of faith attached to it. Possessing
or even being in the presence of the work of art does not add or subtract from the cult value the
object is thought to embody. The cult value is instead closer to the origin of the work, nearly
inherent, and even an audience is brought into the evaluation.
The way that Benjamin discusses cult value may seem removed from the secular art
world with which one is familiar. The idea that a work of art could ever have a value without
being seen seems more like a postmodern conceptual frame for conceiving a new work rather
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than a commentary on how art is actually valued. What about the ‘cult classic’? Benjamin is not
wrong in stating that “today the cult value would seem to demand that the work of art remain
hidden” (Benjamin 225). There are many individuals who obsess over obscurity. In fact, when
an artist exceeds a cult following, individuals are quick to criticize an artist they enjoy for
betraying their roots in the underground . The internet has allowed for an increased ability to
consume works of art by outsiders and amateurs, but as buzz builds, these artists have
opportunities to break into the mainstream and possibly make money off of their artistic labor. Is
cult value so unquestionably pure that the term ‘sellout’ is anything but a backhanded
compliment deserved of a successful musical career?
How does cult contribute to the developing definition of the Value of music as a whole?
There is Value in the work of art which is believed to have value in the context of a ritual, as
something disinterested and purposeless outside of its creation and subsequent ceremonial
involvement, but what can be said for a work which is meant for the world to see? How might
reproduction assist or affect its exhibition and the value associated therewith? As Benjamin
states, “with the emancipation of the various art practices from ritual go increasing opportunities
for the exhibition of the products” (Benjamin 225). A work of art must navigate a tradeoff
between cult value to exhibition value. Once the work is removed from its natural context, it is
reevaluated 
en masse
, no longer valuable because 
it is at all
, but instead the value becomes
factored into how it is displayed, perceived, and discussed.
Benjamin might have qualms with exhibition value on the same grounds that I proposed
aesthetic value often becomes equated with economic value. Insofar as something is beautiful
because it is thought of as beautiful, this beauty begins to become reflected in the price tag
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attached to the work or in the gallery displaying the work. In this way, the art world begins to
shut itself off from the origin of the work, recontextualization and explaining why the work is on
display at all rather than allowing the work to speak for itself. Exhibition value does away with
ritual value not only if the artist intends for the work to be exhibited, but if a curator takes the
time to exhibit it, regardless of original intention.
Can musicmakers possibly escape this paradigm? There are musicmakers as hobbyists
and music makers who might perform only with a religious, ceremonial purpose, but as long as
there is an audience at all, the music is exhibited. Moreover, it is only in the exhibition of music
that an individual can form an opinion about it, an opinion which is the starting point for
valuation. I cannot find Value in a work of music which I have not heard. This is not to say that
music that I have not heard is not valuable, but that declarations of Value can only arise out of
perception on the part of the listener. In these terms, the songs that I write and are never heard by
anyone else have Value in my hearing them, as a part of the ritual of their creation, but this
Value only becomes apparent once I choose to exhibit my work. Therefore, it is clear that the
Value of music is dependent on the cult, faith, or ceremony that inspires the making of the music,
but also requires exhibition for this Value to resonate on a larger level. The technology
surrounding modern reproduction of music, therefore, has only further enabled the transition
from cult to exhibition, giving the means of production back to the artist, so that they can create
work on their own and this work can enter the world to be appreciated or criticized, developing
its Value.
Music making has Value because people become invested in making and consuming it.
Cult value is built by means of investment and often leads to wider reproducibility and
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exhibition. In order for music to have Value, it needs to resonate on the level of cult appreciation
by the artist who makes it for themselves, but the social aspect of value is in its exhibition and
reproduction. It is impossible to comment on the devaluation of reproduced music since what is
known as music is that which is produced and reproduced. There are those who insist that one
cannot appreciate the recorded material of certain artists without seeing them live, without
participating in the ritualism of their performance. Yet, recorded music is an artform in itself. It
is the only means musicmakers have to profit off their work without being present (as in a
performance) and this lack of presence does guarantee an inferior experience. There are as many
artists who are disappointing in their live performance, relying on the power of the studio to
improve their artistic output. Call it inauthentic, but I believe music has value on and off the
stage, in and out of the studio, and this Value is ultimately confirmed insofar as people listen and
appreciate the music, regardless of context. It would have been impossible for Benjamin to
anticipate the extent to which musical reproduction has developed over the course of a century,
yet his comments about aura and value still prove useful in defining the greater Value of music.

Conclusion
Music of Value
What can be concluded about the Value of music? This project has thus far offered a way
of looking at the production and consumption of the arts as defining something called Value.
Moreover, music has been made the subject of a metaphysical examination as a means of
connecting value, as an economic and aesthetic term, to Value as the primordial function of art
upon which any subsequent valuations can be made. The term “Value,” however, has remained
approximate up to this point. I have managed to talk about Value without providing a definition
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which satisfies the constraints that have been placed around it. Therefore, the concluding section
of this project will attempt to reexamine the constraints put on the perceived and inherent Value
of music over the previous three chapters.
In defining the Value of music, this project began by examining the way the term Value
is used most casually, i.e. as economic value. The reason for beginning with economic value
stems from the fact that the Value of a commodity is most explicit when it is considered in terms
of the price tag attached to it. Before the greater importance or function of the commodity is
considered, there are certain financial constraints which guide the market value of a commodity
towards a standardized price or equilibrium. This is not to say, however, that Value is something
that can be standardized, but instead that there is a greater social interaction that sets the price of
a commodity that lacks a consideration of the subjective worth. In this way, economic value is
made to seem like something objective and hints that there may be an aspect of Value which has
an objective quality. The standardized price is arrived at, specifically, by means of an interaction
between the producers willingness to accept the given price for the object and the buyers
willingness to pay this price. Both willingness to accept and the willingness to pay, however, are
independently determined, making the objective nature of this equilibrium subject to the
valuations of the independent, and possibly subjective, parties of producer and consumer.
Out of the interaction between producer and consumer, Marx provides two conflicting
terms that demonstrate the way in which economic value can be subdivided into usevalue and
exchangevalue. Usevalue is equated to the benefit which the commodity offers to the consumer
through its purchase, and continues to preserve a subjective facet of value that economic value
lacks. Marx’s discussion of usevalue tends to avoid the complexity that subjective use
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introduces, instead letting usevalue come to represent that substantial content of wealth that the
commodity can possess, a wealth which is inevitably affected by exchangevalue. Ultimately,
both exchangevalue and usevalue become subservient to a third factor, i.e. money which
dictates how much it cost to produce the commodity and how this production cost either is or is
not affordable to those who might want to purchase it. To this extent, one must bring labor into
the conversation, because ultimately one’s labor both produces and provides the opportunity to
purchase the commodity.
It, therefore, would seem that any conversation about Value must include a conversation
about the labor of the producer. In terms of music, this means one must question whether or not
musicmakers are being properly compensated for their creative work or if the capitalist system
of commodification can ever properly reward the artist. Music is more often than not produced,
purchased, and consumed out of some sort of subjective appreciation and the price music is
given in the market is a result of undercutting in the face of the seemingly objective nature of
capitalism. Unlike other art forms like painting and sculpture which are brought to auction and
are sold to the highest bidder at a given price, music, in its digital form, does not have an object
which can be bought. One could foresee a famous guitarists ax sold in such a manner, but the
music made by that instrument is not embodied in an auctionable object. While music is treated
as a commodity, it does not resemble a commodity, both out of its immateriality as sonic
wavelengths and as something which has been digitized and made infinitely reproducible in the
digital age. Thus, economic value falls short of accounting for the entire Value of music insofar
as it avoids dealing with subjectivity as a consideration of Value and that the economic value of
music more often than not fails the musicmaker as laborer.
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As economic value proves itself to be devaluing, the relationship of the musicmaker to
musicmade reveals itself as an important starting point for looking at why there is still
musicmaking despite the grim financial outlook. How is Value preserved while economic value
fails? In my reading of Heidegger’s 
The Origin of the Work of Art
, Value is described as an
attribute inherently found within any work of art. Just as there can be no work of art without an
artist working, there can be no discussion of value, economic, aesthetic, or otherwise, without
Value bracketing these terms. Art, artist, and the work of art are all interdependently connected
to the origin of the work. No work of art could be a work of art without something called art and
an artist to do the working, establishing the ‘from’ and ‘by which’ Value is subsequently
developed. The work of art is thought to be valuable from the perspective of consumers and
artists who find the work done to be valuable, giving credence to the Value inherent in it. Only in
the relationship between artist and observer are differing valuations (see: economic, aesthetic)
developed. Value must, prior to these distinction, exist for there to be any subsequent valuations
to be considered.
Heidegger is establishing the grounds for the need for a term like Value rather than
attempting to define it. The closest that Heidegger gets to talking about the Value of art,
however, is in his statement that a work of art comes to represent a “happening of truth”.
Specifically, Heidegger describes how a temple, as an example of a work of art, serves the dual
function of being “grounded in the earth” and “jutting through the world” (Heidegger 54).
Although earth and world are only proximally defined in 
The Origin of the Work of Art
, these
terms address both the immaterial and the material. Earth, in this context, is the basis upon which
the temple can stand. It is the solid basis which makes the construction of the temple possible.
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Moreover, the earth represents the time and place in which the art 
is
 a physical foundation. Yet,
the work of art also must “jut through the world” for truth to happen. Thus, the world comes to
represent something immaterial or fabricated. It is common to say that society is a construct, but
Heidegger goes so far as to say that the entire world with which one interacts and reacts is
similarly constructed. Being 
is
, at least on an everyday basis, a matter of being in the world and
knowing what to expect from it. Thus, a work of art gets at something called truth by proposing
something material that comments or causes observers to consider that which is immaterial,
metaphysical, and primordial. In letting truth stand for value, one is offered a proximal approach
to defining the Value of art and, therefore, the Value of music is in its profound capacity to
access and comment upon 
being in general. One 
is
, but one can 
be 
a lot of different ways. Art,
for myself and Heidegger, provides a basis for being which is existentially resolute rather than
misleading or inauthentic.
Heidegger, in my reading of his work, asserts that the Value of music is “the happening
of truth,” revealing an authentic mode of being that acknowledges both the material and
immaterial aspects of existence. Yet, with this definition arrives a constellation of questions
surrounding music, among other art forms, as the optimal mode for relaying or embodying this
Value. As Walter Benjamin demonstrates over the course of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction
, there is potentially a loss of truth, authenticity, and Value under the current
standards by which music is produced and consumed. Under Benjamin’s consideration, the
reproduction of works of art specifically causes a degradation of the Value of the work. This
assertion makes the most sense in relation to visual works of art, reproductions of which became
widely distributed with the introduction of photography at the end of the 20th century. There are
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few that would contest that photographs of paintings are themselves as potent as those works
which they attempt to reproduce. A picture of a Picasso in a magazine, postcard, or website lacks
the physical presence that original work alone embodies. In terms of Heidegger, reproductions
are merely products of the world, in the world, and their relationship to the earth is abstract if not
entirely absent.
Music, however, relates to Benjamin’s claims in an interesting way. If reproductions are
thought to lack the Value that the original work might establish, then musicmaking in the
modern age would be considered entirely valueless. There are certain musicmakers who do not
record their works, either embracing the performative aspect of the medium exclusively or
unperturbed over the idea that no one will ever hear the music they make. Yet, most
musicmakers write and record songs. These recordings of songs are then put onto the internet
and some physical medium like CD, tape, or vinyl. In this way, the very recording of song is the
means to the reproduction thereof. Because of the economic complications that music faces
being mostly removed from a physical commodity, the musicmaker must rely on selling a great
number of these reproductions in order to potentially recoup the costs of making it, if not sustain
a living by means of selling these reproductions. Therefore, Benjamin might be critical of
musicmakers for relying so heavily on reproduction as the modus operandi by which
subsistence can be maintained, but there is no way around it. Musicmakers must be conscious as
to how reproductions of their work can affect the perceived Value, but there is nothing about
reproduction in itself which strips music of its Value. In fact, music may very well be the best
example of how Value is accumulated by means of reproduction as a fanbase is built far and
wide only because reproductions provide disembodied access to the work.
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Ultimately, perhaps the best way of distilling my definition of the Value of music is to
apply this value to an artistic medium that shares a number of key similarities with
musicmaking writing. Writing has been a business for a long time and the price of books has
fluctuated greatly since the first manuscripts were penned. This does not, however, mean that
writing itself has suffered or increased in Value as a creative act. At the end of the day, writing is
about the proposed knowledge that the book might contain. It is not a matter of whether or not
the book sells, but if the content of the book is worth reading in the first place. By these means,
reproductions of written works cannot be said to contain any less knowledge than the first
manuscript the author submitted to their publisher. The publishing and distribution of the work
is, perhaps, the only way that this knowledge could ever have been disseminated. Much like the
music industry, publishing companies are worried about the misplaced powers of reproduction.
While these companies historically profited from writing, selfpublishing and eBook piracy are
now blamed for the decreasing margin of profit possible. Again, these concerns are economically
driven . There is not a question as to whether or not people will continue to write for the sake of
imparting knowledge. The question is if the industry which traditionally supported writers will
continue to exist and if this industry has ever really supported writers at all.
Thus, neither the Value of writing nor the Value music is not measured by a number on a
sales sheet. The Value of music is something like knowledge, from which one learns learned.
The Value of music is in its ability to say something true about the world and this truth might be
affected by reproduction or misrepresentation, but cannot be destroyed. The Value of music is in
the doing, the playing, the hearing, the recording, the production, and the performance. When I
think about a postcapitalist society, a postindustrial society, a postinternetsociety, people will
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continue to make music for the sake of the music being made because the artist finds Value in it
and because someone else might hear it and find Value in it too. Music is a means of
communication, and it is only once one understands Value, distinct from economics, aesthetics,
metaphysics, and ritual, that one can fully focus on what the music communicates.
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